Hotspots and Relocation Schemes

Introduction

The Common European Asylum System (“CEAS“) and the Schengen travel area are in considerable jeopardy. The spontaneous arrival of approximately one million persons in 2015, 90% from the top refugee-producing countries of the world, has cruelly exposed their paradoxes and set in motion centrifugal forces that appear to threaten their very existence. The remedy proposed by the EU institutions includes as its centrepieces the „hotspot approach“ and intra-EU relocation schemes. Great store is being placed in their implementation. Indeed, Greece is reportedly under threat of being excluded from Schengen if it does not implement its „hotspots roadmap“. Hotspots and relocation also loom large in the debate on the future of the CEAS. The Commission has already proposed to include them permanently in the Union“s crisis toolbox and reportedly plans to replace Dublin with a permanent distribution key “quasi-automatically“ allocating protection seekers to Member States.

While no-one denies that the CEAS and Schengen urgently need therapy, it is worth asking whether the EU and its Member States are selecting the right one. I will offer my reflections on this after recalling the context in which hotspots and relocations schemes have been devised, their essential features, and the first experiences made to-date with their implementation.

The context

The arrivals observed throughout 2015 have been concentrated in both Greece – accounting alone for more than 850,000 over the year – and Italy. These two „frontline“ States, have been faced with the  formidable logistical challenge of organizing the first reception and identification of migrants. A full implementation of Dublin and EURODAC would have made the challenges even more difficult. Frontline States would have been responsible for fingerprinting all arriving persons, for receiving their claims, and in most cases – given that Dublin assigns responsibility primarily to the State of first entry – for processing them as well as for organizing long-term reception or return.

Many of these responsibilities have remained virtual. A large part of those that have arrived on Greek shores, in particular, have moved on to other Member States via the „Balkan route“ without filing a claim or being identified there. Failed identification in the first State of entry has in turn raised security concerns and rendered the Dublin system practically inapplicable vis-à-vis the frontline States – nothing new in respect of Greece, already „excised“ from the Dublin system by the European Court of Human Rights in 2011. Destination and transit States have reacted with a flurry of unilateral responses ranging from the temporary reintroduction of checks at internal borders, to the erection of barbed wire fences, to the announcement of national „caps“ on the number of persons who would be admitted to claim asylum.

The situation is quickly degenerating in a chaotic and acrimonious chacun pour soi, where refugees are literally left out in the cold at the borders of e.g. Greece and Croatia. The very idea of common policies based on common rules, common interests, free travel, respect for refugee rights and solidarity (see Art. 77, 78 and 80 TFEU) is in tatters.

For more info